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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 29/01/2008 Accident number: 536 
Accident time: Not recorded Accident Date: 08/07/2004 




Country: Sri Lanka 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 28/07/2004 
ID original source: None Name of source: [Name removed] 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: P2Mk2 P4Mk1 AP 
blast 
Ground condition: rocks/stones 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 29/01/2008 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: SL Grid Coordinates fixed by: GPS 
Map east: Easting/Long.: 142219 Map north: Northing/Lat.: 510079 
Map scale: Point Pedro, 
Katkovalam 
Map series: GIS Arc Explorer 2.0 
Map edition: 27.05.2004 Map sheet: Jaffna.AEP 
Map name: 1: 20000  
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
inadequate training (?) 
long handtool may have reduced injury (?) 
metal-detector not used (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
non injurious accident (?) 
standing to excavate (?) 




The report of this accident was made available in August 2007 as an IMSMA file. Its 
conversion to a document had led to the formatting being lost. The substance of the report is 
reproduced below, edited for anonymity. The original PDF file is held on record. Text in [ ] is 
editorial. 
 
IMSMA accident report 
Date of report: 08.07.2004 
Date of report received:  28.07.2004 
Nearest town: MF LK-257, Katkovalam, Point Pedro Municipality, Jaffna District 
Coord system: SL Grid; Easting/ Long.: 142219; Northing/ Lat.: 510079; GPS 
Map name: Point Pedro, Katkovalam 
Map series: GIS Arc Explorer 2.0 
Map sheet:  Jaffna.AEP 
Map edition: 27.05.2004 
Map scale: 1: 20000 
 
Mine accident coordinates description: 
- Antipersonnel Mine model P4 mark 1 exploded during mine-clearance in minefield LK-257, 
Katkovalam. Explosion took place 1,5 meters in front of [Demining group] deminer while he 
was raking the uncleared lane with heavy rake. 
- Deminer tried to move a 5-10 kg rock with a heavy rake towards himself to pick it up. Stone 
was only partly visible, covered by sand and little rocks. When pulling, it started to move, and 
deminer dragged it slowly towards himself. 
- Explosion occurred and broke the stone, throwing pieces everywhere also hitting the 
deminer. 
- Antipersonnel mine was most likely between the stone and the working deminer in a 1,5 
meter distance.  
- Deminer fell backwards to his bottom and lost his hearing and vision for few minutes. His 
visor (head protection) was hit by little stones and fell off. Fragmentation vest (body 
protection) took some punches too. After 15 minutes he recovered to mentally and physically 
normal state. He did not have any wounds, bruises nor pain anywhere in medic’s full body 
inspection. Nevertheless, he was evacuated against his will.  
- There were not other personnel within safety distance which is 10 meters in minefield LK-
257. 





Internal demining group Lessons Learned document, 
• The team leader didn’t close the lane where the incident occurred, and the work in 
the lane continued after a couple of hours. 
• There were no injury report filled by the local doctor in the area, the deminer was only 
examined by one of the team paramedics. 
• The assistants in HQ misunderstood information from the area. Thereby the incident 
changed from a deminer setting off a mine, into a deminer who had found the crater 
of a detonated mine in his lane.  
• The assistants in HQ didn’t have enough insight into the demining process, and 
thereby they couldn’t question the information from the team leader. 
• The senior staffs in HQ have to investigate all not normal information from the 
operation areas, and inform the operation manager about it. 
• At the time of the incident there were no technical advisor in the operation area, and it 
is believed that that is the main reason to all the mistakes. 
 
Action taken within [Demining group]: 
• Retraining of all our team leaders in their responsibilities concerning 
accidents/incidents have been carried out, and they have all been informed about the 
mistakes in this incident. 
• Retraining of all our paramedics and their responsibilities has been carried out. 
• HQ will in the future repeat the signals from the operation areas, and the team leader 
will confirm the reply from HQ. 
• In the future the operations manager will personally confirm any not normal signals 
from the operation areas, to avoid the same mistakes in the future.  
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 708 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not taken to hospital 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron, Long 
visor 
 
Summary of injuries: 
minor Hearing 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made. This was considered a non-injurious accident. 
3 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because the deminer 
should have raked the area leading up to the rock before trying to move it. It seems that he 
did not know that he should do this. 
The secondary cause is listed as a “Management control inadequacy” because the post-
accident field and medical events were entirely mismanaged. The internal investigators stated 
that this was probably because there was no ex-patriot present. If the training of National staff 
was not good enough for them to operate within the approved SOPs without an ex-patriot 
present, the work should have been suspended while suitable candidates were trained. Other 
demining groups in Sri Lanka have no trouble finding well-educated and responsible field 
supervisors who can be readily trained. 
The demining group had put in place the use of a long tool (rake) that kept the Victim far 
enough away from a blast to avoid injury, and his PPE was effective at protecting him from 
any risk remaining at that distance. Had he been using conventional short hand-tools, some 
injury would have been expected. 
Stand-off (distance from the detonation) is the most effective PPE and the Rake Excavation 
system makes use of this. It is possible that the extreme length of the tool makes initiation of 
small AP blast mines with the Heavy rake more likely, but any increased risk of initiation is 
offset by the reduced chance of that initiation resulting in injury. The accident is a good 
example of balancing an effective demining process and PPE to result in a very low risk of 
injury. 
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